Hegel’s philosophy seems to be mainly a method for thinking. The question regarding knowledge has an enormous tradition. For Aquinas for instance the only method of knowledge was analogy. From the analogy of Being of Aquinas, which states that we can only know, God for example,through a system of comparables, or through proportions in Kant’s philosophy, we pass towards Hegel’ dialects which generally speaking does not imply anymore a system of oppositions, but rather one of inclusion where the universal includes the particular. In other words, in Hegel’s view he negation itself contains the positive that has been negated. For him there isn’t contrariety, there is one and the multiple, there isn’t universal and particular, but rather the universal of the particular. Between the two concepts there is a relation, a mediation. There is positive in the negative, because for instance, the non a contains already a. We can no longer talk about an opposition, the finite is not the opposite of the infinite (the finite is already a reference system for the infinite right because the finite is contained in the word infinite). Consequently the relation between the two concepts is rather a transition, which can no longer be finite or infinite, it is rather the very movement between them. In the case of the double negation : the finite is not nonfinite, what surfaces is the positive, because copula to be is transitive. In other words “is” does not have a meaning in itself, it is right the transitivity between finite and infinite. But if what surfaces is the positive (the negation of a negation) we could say that the finite is the infinite, or that the argument is an infinite with a finite in itself. But this transition is not a backwards perspective, it is rather the synthesis of those two positions. The two concepts become circular and the result obtained is an elevated one. So if the infinite has already the finite in itself and if the first one is preserved in the second one in its very negation what we obtain is a third, elevated term : the finite is the infinite. This synthesis, this third element was missing in Aquinas analogy or in Kant’s proportion. For example the goodness of God could be problematized only as the relation between two terms, human goodness and God’s goodness. In Heidegger’s view the infinite is already present in the finite right because it made it (and here apparently all ontological difference seems to be abolished) and in that respect Hegel’s dialectics could be considered pure immanentism. But that not what Hegel says. The distance ontic-ontological is only a formal one, because two concepts does not exist in themselves, what exists is the mediation between them. For Heidegger being is its negation, but that means it is the very Being because it contains it. Or in other words the being is the phenomenalisation of the Being. So the consciousness goes through different reductions and it gets to the last reduction which is the ethics of the spirit, but when it gets to the very limit of the consciousness that very limit is the Sipirit in its manifestation or phenomenalisation. Consequently if we analyze the dialectic method to the consciousness and we infer that consciousness is its negation what we get to is one more time a third element, elevated, the synthesis : consciousness is the Spirit. This sounds pretty cool to me. So what is beyond consciousness, its negation can not be still consciousness but the very Spirit. Or to use Kant’s terminology we move from the sensibil aperceptiv through the aperceptiv to the pure consciousness, or the transcendental ego, which is similar with Husserl’s phenomenological reduction. In Marx philosophy this Spirit becomes the spirit of classes, something that is above individual consciousness. But in order to be accepted as a philosophical reduction that spirit of the classes should be indeterminate, and in that respect Marx is later going to be criticized by Agamben.